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Chapter 6

The Transformative Influence of
International Law and Practice on
the Death Penalty in the
United States
Richard J. Wilson

In the past decade, international law, policy and practice have had a profound if not
transformative role in shifting global law and practice on capital punishment dramatically
in the direction of abolition. No other body of law and policy arguably has had so profound
an influence in narrowing and eliminating the death penalty worldwide, but especially
in the United States. These developments are most evident from what has happened
outside of the United States. International law’s internal influence in the United States is,
for many reasons relating to U.S. exceptionalism, resisted but no less important. Professor
Roger Hood, one of the most recognized authorities on the death penalty, calls this global
phenomenon a “new dynamic,” one firmly grounded in principles of international human
rights:
[F]oremost among the factors that have promoted this new wave of abolition
has been the political movement to transform consideration of capital punishment
from an issue to be decided solely or mainly as an aspect of national criminal
justice policy to one with the status of a fundamental violation of human rights:
not only the right to life but the right to be free from excessive, repressive, and
tortuous punishments — including the risk that an innocent or undeserving
person may be executed (Hood and Hoyle 2009:17).
Much of the momentum for this change comes from international organizations or
tribunals. The United Nations’ constellation of bodies, the European political and judicial
bodies, and the Inter-American and African systems of human rights have all called for
an end to the death penalty through a global moratorium on executions followed by
eventual abolition. All have criticized the United States for its retention of the death
penalty or practices in its administration. Another noted authority, William Schabas,
notes that “abolition of the death penalty has become a central theme in the standardsetting and monitoring by . . . key international organizations” (Schabas 2004–2005:419).
The views of the international community have begun to penetrate into domestic U.S.
institutions as well. In its 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons, for example, the United
States Supreme Court struck down the death penalty for all juveniles under 18 years old
at the time of their offenses. The Court first took cognizance of world practice. It noted
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that “only seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offenders
since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and China. Since then each of these countries has either abolished capital
punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice. [citation omitted] In
sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned
its face against the juvenile death penalty” (Roper 2005:577). More important, however,
was the majority’s acknowledgment of the role of international law in its interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s “evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society,” a standard developed in the Court’s interpretation
of that amendment. That evolution includes not just U.S. practice but that of the rest of
the world as well. “It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty,” the majority reasoned, “resting
in large part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of young
people may often be a factor in the crime. . . . The opinion of the world community, while
not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for
our own conclusions” (Roper 2005:578). Although not explicitly mentioned in the Court’s
judgment in this and earlier cases on the death penalty, a powerful and persuasive friendof-court brief was submitted by former U.S. diplomats who argued that the death penalty
in the United States impairs U.S. foreign policy interests and strains relationships with
our allies (Koh 2002:1119–1120; Warren 2004–2005:316).
The trend in the use and influence of international law on the death penalty has also
penetrated deeply into academic literature. Until about a decade ago, the only text dealing
with international law and the death penalty was William Schabas’ classic work on the
topic (Schabas 2002). Now, in addition to the many new sources cited in this chapter,
there is another edited volume devoted exclusively to international law and the death
penalty, (York 2008), as well as chapters on international law in the two standard law
student texts on capital punishment, among others (Coyne & Entzeroth 2012; Rivkind
& Shatz 2009). This chapter will closely review these remarkable external and internal influences of international law in the U.S. debate over the capital punishment experiment.
It begins with a short review of the treatment of international law as a source for decisionmaking in capital cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, followed by a survey of trends in the
use of the death penalty worldwide. It will then review the actions of the United Nations
and other international bodies in regard to the death penalty generally, as well as in regard
to U.S. interactions and engagement with those bodies.
No region of the world has been more vocal and persistent in its opposition to U.S.
death penalty practice than Europe, which has itself become a death penalty-free zone.
The chapter will examine the actions taken by European legislative and judicial bodies
against U.S. practice of the death penalty, as well as those of the other regional treaty
bodies, with particular attention to the Inter-American human rights system, in which
the U.S. reluctantly participates. It then will examine U.S. interactions with its treaty
partners in the area of extradition, where death penalty policy is acted out in the exchanges
of prisoners, both accused and convicted, between countries. Finally, the chapter will
conclude with an analysis of the impacts on the capital sentencing of foreign nationals
in the U.S. courts, particularly as a result of the U.S. executive branch and courts’ efforts
at compliance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Avena case,
involving 51 Mexican nationals on death row in the U.S. (Avena 2004).
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An Historical Perspective on
International Law in Capital Cases in the
United States Supreme Court
In its reliance on international perspectives in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court
majority hearkened back to principles that are part of the founding roots of America,
when international law and practice were essential to our understanding and application
of domestic law. The Declaration of Independence itself starts with familiar language,
but what follows is not as familiar to many:
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to
dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another, and to
assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which
the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel
them to the separation.
Professor Harold Koh notes that in 1776, the fledgling United States had no law of its
own, and the Framers of the Constitution looked to what was then called the Law of Nations,
or international law, which was necessarily applied in the courts of the American colonies.
The newly independent United States had no choice but to display a “decent respect” for the
opinions of mankind (Koh 2002:1087). In fact, Professor Koh notes a deep and long pattern
of reliance by our Supreme Court on international law in all areas, not just in the interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment in its limitations to the death penalty (Koh 2002:1091–1096).
The U.S. Constitution, too, recognizes the legitimate authority of international law.
Article VI, clause 2, the so-called supremacy clause, states: “This Constitution, and all
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges of every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding” (emphasis added).
Treaties, the most formal expression of international law, thus are given a central role in
the governance of the nation by the Constitution itself. The last part of the clause is of
particular importance because most death sentences are handed down in the states, and
the federal constitution gives clear supremacy to treaties over state law, at least on the
face of the document. Supreme Court interpretation of that text is another matter.
Up to and through the 1970s and 1980s, the Court referred to international norms in
death penalty cases interpreting the scope of the Eighth Amendment. In the 1977 Coker
v. Georgia decision, for example, the Court found that international practice regarding
the death penalty for rape was relevant to the Eighth Amendment’s interpretation through
“evolving standards” of “dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency” (Coker
1977:596, n.10). In 1982, in Enmund v. Florida, the justices made reference to comparative
international practice in interpreting the doctrine of felony murder (Enmund 1982:797,
n. 22). In Ford v. Wainwright, the Court again invoked the practice of “civilized societies”
in the capital punishment context (Ford 1986:409). And in 1988, a majority in Thompson
v. Oklahoma found that international practice was relevant in determining that the death
penalty was unconstitutional as applied to a fifteen-year-old child (Thompson 1988:830).
In 1989, however, a narrow five-to-four majority broke with the deep national tradition
of the inclusion of international norms and practice in constitutional analysis, at least as
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to the Eighth Amendment. In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the execution of juveniles who commit their crimes at age sixteen
or older, whatever international opinion may be. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court
asserted, in a footnote, that juvenile sentencing practices in other countries are irrelevant
because “it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive” (Stanford v. Kentucky
1989:369, n.1). That view, however, held sway for only thirteen years in our constitutional
history before swinging back to full acknowledgement of the value of international law
in Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision barring the execution of mentally
retarded persons (Atkins 2002). Moreover, Professor Koh points out that Justice Scalia’s
view on international law’s relevance to the determination of evolving standards of
humanity is inconsistent not only with long historical tradition but with the justice’s own
views in non-capital cases. In the anti-trust context, for example, Justice Scalia argues
that U.S. law should not be interpreted inconsistently with international norms (Koh
2002:1085).
As an acknowledged superpower in the post-Cold War world, the U.S. government
struggles with the relevancy of international law or world opinion to its foreign policy as
well as its domestic law, particularly to advance its objectives in the war on terrorism after
the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Many U.S.
judges today continue to be skeptical or reluctant to apply international norms in their
decisions. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, for example, wrote stinging
dissents in Atkins v. Virginia. The two justices explicitly rejected the majority’s reliance
on international opinion or practice as a source for its jurisprudence. Justice Scalia called
the practices of “the so-called ‘world community’ ” irrelevant, asserting that its “notions
of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people” (at 347). Justice Scalia continued
his critique of the majority’s reliance on international law in Roper v. Simmons, discussed
in the introduction, characterizing the majority opinion as based on “the subjective views
of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners” (at 607).
Without question, the Court’s low-water mark in domestic application of decisions
by international tribunals, and more generally of treaties, came in its 2008 decision in
the capital case of Medellin v. Texas. The Medellin litigation arose from the protracted
filings by several countries — Paraguay, Germany and Mexico — in the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), or World Court, based in The Hague, Netherlands, which hears only
disputes between countries. All of the cases there shared common features. In each, a
foreign national from the country in question was sentenced to death in one of the state
courts of the U.S., and in each, the country in question alleged that its national had not
been properly advised by U.S. officials of the availability of the services of his country’s
consulate, as provided for under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR),
a multi-lateral treaty to which the U.S. and the country in question were parties. All
countries had ratified an additional protocol to the VCCR that called on the ICJ to
adjudicate disputes as to the meaning and application of the treaty. In each case, the ICJ
ruled against the United States. The domestic impact of that international litigation will
be discussed more fully in the final section of this chapter.
Medellin was one of 51 Mexican nationals sentenced to death in Texas, and the first
to have his case heard by the Supreme Court after the ICJ’s Avena judgment. The Medellin
case involved the complex interaction of decisions by the International Court of Justice,
the ways in which the U.S. government could act to honor an outcome of that tribunal
in favor of the Mexican death-row inmates, and the responses of state and federal courts
to an ICJ decision. The Supreme Court’s holdings on international law, particularly as
to treaties affecting the application of the death penalty, were devoid of any reference to
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the supremacy clause of the Constitution. First, it held that neither the Avena decision
of the ICJ, nor a subsequent presidential memo purporting to order implementation of
the decision, was binding on the state courts. Second, it held that none of the relevant
international treaty sources — an Optional Protocol to the VCCR on dispute resolution
by the ICJ, the U.N. Charter, or the ICJ Statute — was a self-executing treaty, that is, one
that operates as law by its terms or intentions, because Congress had not adopted legislation
implementing the treaties. A second failed appeal to the Supreme Court cleared the way
for Mr. Medellin’s execution by Texas on 5 August 2008 (Turner 2008).
The Medellin decision represents one face of the Janus-headed Supreme Court on the
application of international law; the Roper and Atkins line of decisions represent the other,
and opposite, face. One line makes direct application of treaties nearly impossible, while
the other makes customary international law — the practices of the world community —
highly relevant. While suspicion of international law’s validity may lie, at least in part,
in the deep roots of American rebellion against foreign authority, the United States federal
and state courts generally stand badly out of step with international law trends regarding
the death penalty. They may, however, be forced into a legal corner, as the following
sections of this chapter will demonstrate.

Global Perspectives on the Death Penalty
If one takes a particularly long lens to the issue of the death penalty, the prospects for
abolition are excellent. In a recent work examining the decline in global violence over the
broad arc of history, Steven Pinker, the Harvard psychologist, notes that since the 17th
century, both the number of crimes punishable by death and the number of executions
have dropped precipitously. He notes the same trend in the United States, where the rate
of executions per 100,000 people has plummeted, particularly in the 17th and 18th
centuries. Today “only a few tenths of a percentage point of the nation’s murderers are
ever put to death. And the most recent trend points downward: the peak year for executions
[under post-Furman statutes] was 1999, and since then the number of executions per
year has been almost halved” (Pinker 2011:150–151).
World law and practice are moving steadily towards abolition. Within only the last
fifty years, the world has developed a system of treaties and other international norms,
all of which see abolition of the death penalty as a legitimate end of international human
rights law (Schabas 2002:1). The most significant international treaties on human rights
all contain a provision protecting the right to life, and another protecting against cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. While all of those treaties include limited
exceptions to the right to life that permit the death penalty in a narrow set of circumstances,
a systematic review of all international norms on the death penalty “shows an inexorable
progress towards abolition” (Schabas 2002:19).
As of the end of 2012, a total of 140 countries, almost two-thirds of the world’s states,
have abolished the death penalty in law or practice. Ninety-seven countries and territories
have abolished it for all crimes, and another eight have abolished it for all but exceptional
crimes such as those committed in wartime, while another thirty-five countries are
abolitionist in practice because they have not carried out executions for the past ten years
or more. Fifty-eight countries retain the death penalty, but the trend is away from retention,
and it is accelerating. Between 1989 and 1999, 40 countries abolished the death penalty,
all but one for all crimes in all circumstances. Between the end of 2000 and 2010, another
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24 countries abolished the penalty, at least for ordinary crimes (Amnesty International
2012; Hood and Hoyle 2009:6). Moreover, not all retentionist countries execute those
they have sentenced to death. In 2012, for example, only 21 countries were recorded as
having carried out 682 executions, aside from the secret numbers kept in China. The top
five executing countries remained the same as in the previous year — China, Iran, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia and the United States (Amnesty International 2013).
State practice regarding the death penalty continues to show a drop in both the number
of death sentences and the number of executions. In 2012, the United States was the only
country in the Americas to carry out an execution, and Belarus was the only country in
Europe and Central Asia to execute someone during that year. Death sentences and
executions are largely concentrated in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, although only 5
of the 54 countries of the African Union carried out death sentences during 2012 (Amnesty
International 2013:7).
New international criminal tribunals created within the UN system all prohibit capital
punishment. Their jurisdiction includes adjudication of the most serious of crimes known
to mankind: genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The temporary
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, sitting in The
Hague and Arusha, Tanzania, respectively, both bar the death penalty, as does the newly
created International Criminal Court (Schabas 2002:247–258). This is also true with each
of the so-called hybrid tribunals, composed of both local and international elements and
created under the patronage of the UN, for example, in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor,
Cambodia, and Lebanon: “none of the modern international or hybrid [International
Criminal Law] tribunals imposes the death penalty” (Van Schaack & Slye 2010:1004).
Taken together with the information in other chapters in this book, documenting the
decline in the number of death sentences and executions in the United States, it is obvious
that the death penalty is moving toward abolition, in law and in fact.

The UN and U.S. Compliance with International
Human Rights Norms on the Death Penalty
The United States was a leader in the creation of the United Nations, which came into
being in the wake of the horrors of World War II and the Holocaust. The U.S. also took
a leading role in the drafting and adoption by the UN of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the first modern statement of individual protection against abuses of state
power (Glendon 2002). Our government also took a leading role in the creation of the
Organization of American States (OAS) and another lesser-known regional document on
human rights in the Western Hemisphere, the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man. The American Declaration was actually adopted some months before the
Universal Declaration in 1948. At the time of their adoption, these two human rights
declarations were not intended to have the force of law. As “declarations” rather than
treaties, they expressed the human rights principles and aspirations for the region and
the world, but governments, then as now, were reluctant to guarantee personal freedoms
as legally binding obligations. The two documents were, in short, what their names
imply — statements of goals for governments and not legally binding “treaties.” But over
time, each of the two declarations would gain global recognition, bringing their provisions
into the realm of customary international law.
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Over its first two decades, the UN became more assertive in its articulation of human
rights norms. One of the earliest actions to deal specifically with the death penalty was
that of the UN Committee on Crime Prevention and Control in 1982, when it adopted
Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty. The
Safeguards were endorsed by resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1984, and later
amended in 1989. The Safeguards garnered a strong endorsement from the UN Economic
and Social Council again in 1996 (Schabas 2008:18–22, 28).
The UN also adopted several human rights treaties that set out human rights more fully
than the declarations of the 1940s. In the UN system, the most important of these global
treaties for our purposes were the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), adopted in 1966; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention), adopted in 1987; and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race
Convention), also adopted in 1966. Each of these treaties has been ratified by the United
States. The ICCPR is one of the most important and widely ratified human rights treaties
in the world, with 167 ratifying countries as of mid-summer 2013. Article 6 of the ICCPR
protects the right to life, and permits the death penalty in certain limited circumstances:
“only for the most serious crimes”; only “pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent
court”; and with the mandatory “right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence.”
Article 6 further forbids the sentence of death for persons under 18 and pregnant women.
As to the treaty’s limitations, the Human Rights Committee, charged with interpretation
of the ICCPR, has found Article 6 to mean that while “States parties are not obliged to
abolish the death penalty totally they are obliged to limit its use and, in particular, to abolish
it for other than the ‘most serious crimes.’ ” “[T]he death penalty,” the Committee concludes,
“should be a quite exceptional measure” (Human Rights Committee 1994:¶¶ 6, 7).
The ICCPR has a Second Optional Protocol that entered into force in 1991. It binds
states parties to permanent abolition of the death penalty except under narrow exceptions
in wartime; as of mid-2013, that treaty had 76 parties and an additional 36 signatories,
binding those who have signed not to violate the object and purpose of the treaty. Together
with the 43 ratifications and 2 signatures of Protocol 13 to the European Convention on
Human Rights, which abolishes the death penalty for all purposes, and the 11 ratifications
of the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty, these three instruments move states closer to a global commitment never to
return to capital punishment. One can no longer say, in the face of states’ ratification of
these treaties, that international law does not per se prohibit the death penalty.
The United States consistently has resisted full acceptance of its human rights treaty
responsibilities. When it finally ratified the ICCPR in 1992, and both the Torture and
Race Conventions in 1994, the government attached numerous exceptions to their
provisions, generally called “reservations.” When it ratified both the ICCPR and the Torture
Convention, for example, the U.S. filed reservations that limit its obligations to protect
against “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” as expressed in both
treaties. The U.S. reservations assert that the clause “means the cruel and unusual
punishment” prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. Thus, the government means to assume
no new obligations under the treaty; U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of cruel and
unusual punishment are said to be good and sufficient.
The Human Rights Committee, after its 2006 review of the last full periodic report of
the United States government on its compliance with the ICCPR (another, the fourth, is
due in late 2013), was critical of U.S. law and practice on the death penalty. The Committee’s
conclusions were pointed:
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The State party should review federal and state legislation with a view to restricting
the number of offences carrying the death penalty. The State party should also
assess the extent to which death penalty is disproportionately imposed on ethnic
minorities and on low-income population groups, as well as the reasons for this,
and adopt all appropriate measures to address the problem. In the meantime, the
State party should place a moratorium on capital sentences, bearing in mind the
desirability of abolishing the death penalty (Human Rights Committee 2006:¶29).
The call for a moratorium on the death penalty has become a central issue for the
entire UN membership. While those actions are directed to all retentionist states, they
arguably have most resonance in the large and influential states that carry out the most
death sentences, particularly the United States and China, both permanent members of
the Security Council. When the UN General Assembly met in 2007, it had twice before
failed to muster sufficient support for a resolution on a death penalty moratorium (Schabas
2004–2005:437– 438). That year, however, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
calling for a global moratorium by a vote of 104 in favor to 54 against (including the
United States), with 29 abstentions (UN General Assembly 2007). Since that first decision,
the General Assembly has adopted similar resolutions in 2008, 2010 and most recently,
in March of 2013 (UN General Assembly 2013). The UN human rights entities have,
within recent years, become a locus for intense scrutiny of the scope and limitations on
the death penalty. The 47-member UN Human Rights Council replaced the former Commission on Human Rights in 2006, and has since been a pivotal location within the UN
for discussion of the death penalty and calls for its abolition. In its 2011 meeting, for
example, it called on the UN Secretary General to submit a yearly report to the Council
on capital punishment (UN Human Rights Council 2011), which the Secretary General
has provided in each subsequent year (UN Human Rights Council 2012). In March of
2013, the Council, along with many non-member states, called for two panel discussions
at a future Council session: one on the human rights of children of parents sentenced to
death or executed, and a “high-level” panel on the question of the death penalty (UN
Human Rights Council 2013a; 2013b).
The UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, currently Navi Pillay, has also been
actively supportive of abolition. In July of 2012, her office held what it termed the first
in “a series of global panel discussions on the abolition of the death penalty,” called Moving
Away from the Death Penalty: Lessons from National Experience (UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights 2012). And in 2013, Geneva played host to a meeting
of the newly created International Commission against the Death Penalty, where both
the Secretary General (UN Secretary General 2013) and the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2013) supported calls for a
global moratorium and eventual abolition of the death penalty. The International
Commission against the Death Penalty was initiated by the government of Spain in 2010,
with the support of 16 other governments, to give impetus and momentum to the moratorium/abolition movement (International Commission against the Death Penalty 2013).
The UN has a Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
whose annual reports have made specific references to abuses by the United States in its
application of the death penalty. After a special mission to the United States in 1998, the
Special Rapporteur called on the United States to adopt a moratorium on executions,
among other reform measures (UN Commission on Human Rights 1998:¶ 156). In 2009
(UN Human Rights Council 2009:¶ 77), and again in 2012 (UN Human Rights Council
2012:¶ 87), the Special Rapporteur called for the United States not to apply the death
penalty to crimes tried by military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The United
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States ignored the recommendation, and six defendants now face trials in which the death
penalty can be imposed (Maers 2011; U.S. Department of Defense 2012).
In August of 2012, the current Special Rapporteur, Christof Heyns, together with
another Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan Mendez, issued simultaneous reports on
the same day regarding the death penalty generally. Heyns’ first recommendation called
on all states to “heed the calls made by the United Nations and regional human rights
bodies to establish a moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty”
(UN General Assembly 2012a:¶ 118). Another innovative recommendation from that
Rapporteur calls for international organizations to help corporations to “undertake to in
no way assist the unlawful imposition of the death penalty” (at ¶ 131). That
recommendation refers to an earlier discussion in the report regarding the role of medical
personnel in the administration of lethal injections (at ¶¶ 95– 97). In addition to the call
to medical personnel, there has been a massive and well-organized international effort
to help and encourage pharmaceutical companies to prevent the use of their drugs for
executions in the United States. This work is exemplified by the Stop the Lethal Injection
Project (SLIP) of Reprieve, an NGO based in the United Kingdom (Reprieve 2013).
Professor Mendez, the Rapporteur on Torture, goes even further. After extensive documentation of state practice on the issue, the Rapporteur concludes that a “new approach” is
needed for treatment of the issue of the death penalty in international law. Where past analysis
was largely within the framework of the right to life, Professor Mendez calls for a debate
“within the context of the fundamental concepts of human dignity and the prohibition of
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (UN General Assembly
2012b:¶74). The Rapporteur concludes that he is “convinced that a customary norm prohibiting
the death penalty under all circumstances, if it has not already emerged, is at least in the
process of formation” (at ¶72). This legal development could have immense ramifications
in the United States, for two primary reasons. First, the Supreme Court has consistently
found that customary international law is a source of law in the United States, without the
qualifiers it attaches to treaty interpretation. It did this most recently in its 2004 decision in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, a case that cites with approval the 1900 Paquete Habana case, which
holds that “international law is part of our law” (referring to the law of nations, or customary
international law) (Sosa 2004:730). Second, although technically distinct, the concept of
customary international law is much closer to the notion of the concept of the legal views
of the “world community,” a concept the Court’s majority was comfortable to invoke in overturning the death penalty in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, discussed above.

The Regional Human Rights Systems and the
Death Penalty in the United States:
Europe, the Americas and Africa
Europe. No region has been more critical of the United States or more aggressive in
attacking its position on the death penalty than Europe, itself a virtually death penaltyfree zone. There is, however, a threshold question as to what exactly constitutes the
geography of “Europe” today, for legal purposes. It might be seen as the 27 countries of
the European Union, or as the 47 countries of the Council of Europe, which extends the
reach of the continent from the Atlantic Ocean to the furthest Pacific borders of the
Russian Federation. Or, most broadly, it might encompass the 57 participating states of
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the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including countries
from Europe, Central Asia and North America, including the United States. Whatever
their geography, each of these entities through their leadership has called for at least a
moratorium, and ultimately, for abolition.
The European Union has been a consistent leader within the United Nations on the
global moratorium issue, starting at least in 1997, when it sponsored, for each of at least
six consecutive sessions of the old UN Commission on Human Rights, a global moratorium
with a view to abolition (Dennis 2003:368–369). Within the Union itself, its political bodies
have adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which explicitly
bars the death penalty in its Article 2.2: “No one shall be condemned to the death penalty,
or executed” (European Union 2007). The European Parliament, the Union’s legislature,
has often called broadly for a universal moratorium on the death penalty (European
Parliament 2007), but it has also more bluntly called on the U.S. to institute a moratorium
on the penalty (European Parliament 2010:¶ 7). By the same token, the European
Parliamentary Assembly had strongly considered revocation of the U.S. status as observer
within the 47-member Council of Europe, beginning in 2001, based on its retention of the
death penalty (Parliamentary Assembly 2001). In 2011, the Assembly directly called on the
United States to “join the growing consensus among democratic countries that protect
human rights and human dignity by abolishing the death penalty” (Parliamentary Assembly
2011:1). These political actions join with the legal actions of the European Court of Human
Rights, particularly in the extradition context discussed below, to make Europe a powerful
regional voice calling for U.S. limitation and eventual abolition of capital punishment.
The 57-member OSCE, whose members include the United States, has also spoken
against the death penalty. In July of 2010, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted a
resolution on the death penalty at its annual session. It, like many others, calls for all retentionist states to “declare an immediate moratorium on executions,” but also calls on
the United States to adopt a moratorium “leading to the complete abolition of the death
penalty in federal legislation” (OSCE 2012:31, ¶¶ 46, 50).
The Americas. The Inter-American system for the protection of human rights was set
up to monitor compliance with the American Declaration and Convention. The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, a group of 7 independent experts on human
rights sitting in Washington, DC, reviews human rights complaints arising in the Americas.
Cases decided by the Commission can go on to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica, so long as the relevant country has ratified the Convention
and agreed to submit to the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court, with 7 members appointed
in their individual capacity by the OAS General Assembly, decides contentious case and
issues advisory opinions, while the Inter-American Commission issues recommendations
to governments that arguably have binding legal effects as well. The OAS adopted the
American Convention on Human Rights in 1969. The American Convention, along with
several other human rights treaties in the Inter-American human rights system, serves as
a regional compliment to the global treaties. There are 24 active parties to the American
Convention; Trinidad & Tobago withdrew in 1999 over disputes on the use of the death
penalty there, and Venezuela announced its intent to withdraw from the Convention in
September of 2012 (International Justice Resource Center 2012).
At the regional level, the United States signed but has not ratified the American
Convention on Human Rights, and it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. This does not mean, however, that it can completely
avoid scrutiny in that system for its own human rights violations. As a signatory to the
Convention, it is bound not to act in violation of the object and purpose of the treaty.
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And the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights can still hear individual complaints
against the United States. In fact, over time, several decisions by international bodies
have found that the human rights recognized in the American Declaration, and in the
OAS Charter, a treaty to which the U.S. is a party, together create binding human rights
obligations. The Inter-American Commission applies that law to the United States and
asserts that its decisions are binding on the United States. The United States government,
however, “categorically” rejects any assertion that the American Declaration has acquired
binding legal force and refuses to comply with Commission recommendations (Wilson
2002:1160).
Over the past decade, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has made the
death penalty in the hemisphere, and particularly in the United States, a centerpiece of its
contentious jurisprudence. Staff sources there estimated that 60–70 percent of all new
filings against the U.S. during 1999 and 2000, some 130 cases, involved the death penalty
(Wilson 2002:1174–1175). All of those cases have moved through the system, although
many remain to be resolved. Between 2003 and 2013, there have been eight U.S. capital
cases involving 14 named death row defendants resolved on the merits, all of which found
serious human rights violations. Another 21 cases, involving 34 death-row petitioners, were
found to be admissible during the same time period, meaning that they will continue to
decision on the merits, while the Commission requested precautionary measures from the
U.S. government to protect 29 individuals from execution pending consideration of their
cases by the Commission. A few of these matters overlap, and involve the same individuals,
but the work of the Commission was significant enough that it published a significant
separate study, The Death Penalty in the Inter-American Human Rights System: From
Restrictions to Abolition, in 2011 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2011).
The comprehensive study of the death penalty started with a stern rebuke to those
countries, including the United States, that execute in “contempt” of decisions by bodies
of the Inter-American human rights system. When individuals are executed in defiance
of decisions on the merits by the Commission, this signals “a grave violation of international
obligations” (at ¶ 58). It also notes that execution of a person under precautionary or
provisional measures from the Commission or the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights “constitutes an aggravated violation of the right to life” (at ¶ 48). The report goes
on to summarize its findings in the myriad death penalty cases it reviews from around
the hemisphere, revealing violations of both principles governing limitations on the death
penalty as well as fair trial rights. As for the principles, the report addresses such issues
as the “heightened scrutiny” standard of review, the improper mandatory imposition of
the death penalty by statute, imposition for only the most serious crimes, and the right
to apply for amnesty, pardon or commutation of a death sentence (at 25– 84) In the fair
trial arena, the Commission and Court have touched on a wide array of issues such as
the right to an impartial and independent decision-maker, the right to competent counsel,
and to legal aid if necessary, and the right to consular access for those foreign nationals
facing capital charges (at 85–160). The report concludes with a call to all member states
to “impose a moratorium on executions as a step toward the gradual disappearance of
the death penalty,” urging states to join the eleven countries of the hemisphere that have
ratified the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty (at ¶ 141).
A typical death penalty case from the United States gives a better idea of the actions
of the Commission in this area. In Raul Garza v. United States, the Commission reviewed
its first federal death penalty case. In 2001, the Commission held that Mr. Garza had
been denied a fair trial and due process of law when the sentencing jury in his case was
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allowed to hear evidence of four unadjudicated murders in Mexico with which Mr. Garza
was connected. The Commission called for commutation of Garza’s death sentence.
Attempts to enforce the Commission’s decision in the U.S. Courts failed, and on June 19,
2001, Mr. Garza was executed, about a week after the execution of Timothy McVeigh for
his role in the Oklahoma City federal building bombing (Wilson 2002:1180–1182).
In Garza, the U.S. government aggressively opposed the petitions before the Commission
and ultimately refused to take any action to comply with the Commission’s
recommendations at any stage in the proceedings. The State Department’s Office of the
Legal Adviser, which represented the U.S. government in this litigation, at no point took
action to support the Commission’s decision in the courts, as it might have. The petitioner
also sought precautionary measures to protect Mr. Garza pending his execution. While
most countries in Latin America comply with such measures from the Commission or
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the United States generally declined to comply
with decisions of the Commission, or with its requests for precautionary measures in any
death penalty case. One glimmer of cooperation has occurred in the Vienna Convention
cases discussed in a later section of this chapter. Despite near-complete rejection by the
U.S. government of the authority of the Commission’s rulings, the Commission is likely
to decide many more capital cases involving the United States.
Africa. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, too, has compiled a
recent comprehensive report on its work regarding the death penalty. The Commission’s
Working Group on the Death Penalty issued its Study on the Question of the Death Penalty
in Africa in 2011 (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2011). The study
is the culmination of years of effort, during which the Working Group examined arguments
and data regarding arguments for and against the death penalty. The Study concludes
that “what emerges from the survey of the pros and cons of the death penalty is that the
abolishionist case appears more compelling than the retentionist case.” In spite of any
shortcomings to its own examination of the issue, the Working Group continues, “any
additional study is unlikely to change the basic findings of the Study in relation to the
necessity for the abolition of the death penalty” (at 54).
Taken together, these actions by the regional human rights bodies represent increasingly
aggressive postures in favor of moratoria and eventual abolition of the death penalty. A
close reading of their actions shows the synergistic reactions between the global and
regional human rights bodies, all leaning inexorably toward abolition.

Pressure from Outside of the United States:
Barring Extradition to Face Capital Punishment
As other countries continue to abolish the death penalty, the United States faces
increasing difficulties with extradition, where a bilateral treaty usually governs the exchange
of persons accused or convicted of crimes in one of the two countries, whose removal is
sought by the receiving country. In such cases, the sending country is increasingly reluctant
to send anyone to face a possible death sentence in the United States. It was recently
reported in a research memo to the U.S. Congress that the United States has “over 100
bilateral extradition treaties” (Congressional Record 1998:20407). A complete list as of
2011 shows 112 such treaties, plus multilateral treaties with the European Union and
some countries in the Americas (U.S. Code 2011). The memo continues that as more
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countries abolish the death penalty, “there has been a concomitant trend toward including
capital punishment restrictions in new extradition agreements.” An “illustrative list” of
such countries totaled 27. Another study of extradition treaties in 2010 adds an additional
7 individual countries, plus the 27 countries of the European Union that uniformly refuse
extradition without assurances against the death penalty (Congressional Reference Service
2010:9, n. 42). Thus, at least 61 countries will not send accused persons, often alleged
terrorists, to the U.S. for trial without a guarantee that the death penalty will not be
imposed. This policy was suggested as early as 1990, where Article 4 of the UN General
Assembly’s Model Treaty on Extradition permits the refusal of extradition if the offense
for which it was sought carried the death penalty and the sending state does not receive
assurances against capital punishment (UN General Assembly 1990). The Princeton
Principles on Universal Jurisdiction were adopted by an eminent group of international
scholars in 2001. In its Principle 10, the Principles make refusal of extradition based on
universal jurisdiction offenses mandatory if the death penalty is possible in the receiving
state (Princeton Principles 2001).
The use of extradition to move an accused or convicted person across borders is not
the only legal vehicle available to the U.S.: deportation and state-sponsored kidnapping,
colloquially called “irregular rendition,” are also available. In 2001, Amnesty International
made a chillingly prescient prediction that impediments to extradition might cause the
United States government to expand the practice of state kidnapping to guarantee the
option of imposing the death penalty here (Amnesty International 2001). Such is exactly
the situation in the case of the 14 so called “high-value” detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
all of whom arrived there from black sites to which they had been kidnapped by U.S. authorities; six now face the death penalty in military commission trials (Karl 2006).
The contemporary focus on the use of assurances against the death penalty began with
the unusual 1989 case of Jens Soering, a young German citizen whose extradition was
sought from England to the United States. Soering faced capital murder charges in the
Commonwealth of Virginia. His lawyers challenged his extradition on several grounds in
Britain, and after full review there, the case went to the European Court of Human Rights
(“European Court” or ECHR) in Strasbourg, France. The European Court found a violation
of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits “inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment” (Soering 1989:111). The Court concluded that
if he were to be extradited to the United States, Soering would face the psychological
trauma of what the court called “the death row phenomenon.” The death row phenomenon
is comprised of a number of factors, some of which are shared by all inmates on death
row in the U.S., and some of which were unique to Mr. Soering. The Court found that
the average time a condemned prisoner can expect to stay on death row in Virginia, at
the time, was six to eight years. During that time, the Court noted, inmates await their
executions with growing anguish, often under repeated warrants for execution, which
are ultimately suspended. Conditions on death row are also extremely harsh for all who
are under sentence of death. The Court noted the risk of physical and homosexual attack,
as well as the stringency of custody in general. Finally, the Court noted that Soering
himself was only 18 at the time of his alleged offense, and reports showed strong evidence
that he suffered from a mental disturbance that might mitigate his culpability. Taken
together, the Court concluded that it could not condone the virtually inevitable mistreatment
of Mr. Soering on death row in Virginia, and that to send him there to face a possible
capital sentence would constitute inhuman or degrading treatment (Soering 1989:¶¶ 105–
109). As a result of the Court’s ruling, England sought and obtained assurances from
prosecutors in the state of Virginia that Soering would not be subjected to the possibility
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of a death sentence. He was then extradited, tried and sentenced to two life terms (Lillich
1991:141).
The Soering precedent has lent itself to a growing jurisprudence on extradition and
the death penalty. The death row phenomenon argument has never gained purchase in
the U.S. Supreme Court, and is not likely to do so in the future unless the Court changes
composition. In 2009, after repeated denials of certiorari on the death row phenomenon
issue, Justice Stevens seemed to close the door on the issue with his statement that “[m]ost
regrettably, a majority of this Court continues to find these issues not of sufficient weight
to merit our attention” (Johnson v. Bredesen 2009:544, and see Marriott 2008:159 passim).
The fundamental argument that execution or conditions on death row can constitute
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment has prospered in a number of contexts (Schabas
1996). The remainder of this section examines developments in Canada-U.S. exchanges
of prisoners, an important case from South Africa, and the definitive jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights on this issue.
The Canadian Supreme Court decided United States v. Burns in 2001. In that case, the
nation’s highest court ruled that assurances against the death penalty must be sought in
extraditions involving the United States “in all but exceptional cases” (United States v.
Burns 2001:¶ 8). The court found that the justice minister’s failure to seek assurances
against the death penalty was a violation of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, the Canadian equivalent to the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights. Section
7 protects the right to life, liberty and security “and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice” (United States v. Burns
2001:¶ 58). The court found that there were many factors that mandate the seeking of
assurances, including “the evolution of international extradition standards, the worldwide
trend toward abolition, growing concerns over the adequacy of US capital procedures,
and the inherent risk of wrongful conviction and execution” (Amnesty International
2001:12–13). William Schabas calls “the danger of executing the innocent” the first and
most important reason for the court’s action (Schabas 2001:668). Burns was returned,
together with Rafay, a co-defendant, to Washington State for trial with a guarantee that
they would not face the death penalty.
Another Canadian case resulted in advances in international law but has not yet been
honored fully within the United States. In 1987, a U.S. national named Roger Judge was
convicted in Pennsylvania state court of murder and sentenced to death. He subsequently
escaped to Canada, where he was convicted of other crimes and served his time, after
which Canadian immigration officials sought his deportation to the United States. Judge’s
efforts to obtain assurances against the death penalty resulted in protracted litigation that
was unavailing, and he was deported to the United States in August of 1998 (Murphy
2004:180–181). On the day of his deportation, he filed a petition with the Human Rights
Committee, pursuant to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (Judge 2002). The
Committee found that while paragraphs 2 through 6 of Article 6 to the ICCPR contained
exceptions permitting the death penalty for the most serious crimes, Canada could not
avail itself of those exceptions, which are available only to countries that have not abolished
the death penalty:
For countries that have abolished the death penalty [as Canada had], there is an
obligation not to expose a person to the real risk of its application. Thus, they
may not remove, either by deportation or by extradition, individuals from their
jurisdiction if it may be reasonably anticipated that they will be sentenced to
death, without ensuring that the death sentence would not be carried out (at
¶ 10.4).
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Canada violated Judge’s right to life under Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Covenant, the
Committee concluded, by not ensuring that the death penalty would not be carried out
in the United States (at ¶ 10.6). As such, Judge was entitled to “an appropriate remedy”
from Canada, which should include “such representations as are possible” to the U.S. to
prevent the death sentence from being carried out (at ¶ 12). No public record indicates
that Canada ever made such representations.
Roger Judge continued his quest for vindication in the U.S. courts after his involuntary
return to Pennsylvania. His arguments on Canada’s obligations under the ICCPR have
thus far failed to persuade either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (Commonwealth v.
Judge 2007:149, 152) or a federal district court (Judge v. Beard 2012:32). The federal court
deferred to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision that the ICCPR was a non-selfexecuting treaty that conferred no rights on Mr. Judge in the absence of implementing
legislation. The federal court did grant Judge relief from his death sentence on grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel not related to the treaty violation, and U.S. litigation
may continue.
In May of 2001, the Constitutional Court of South Africa ruled that South African
government officials had violated constitutional and statutory obligations by refusing to
seek assurances against the death penalty for Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, whose extradition
was sought by the United States in connection with the bombing of the U.S. embassy in
Tanzania. Mohamed was summarily deported directly into the hands of waiting U.S.
officials. Drawing from many international and comparative sources, including its own
1995 decision finding that the death penalty in South Africa violated fundamental human
rights and the constitution, the court found that the government had violated Mohamed’s
right to life and dignity, and his right to be protected from cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment (Mohamed 2001). It also took the highly unusual step of sending its judgment
directly to the U.S. federal judge presiding over Mohamed’s capital murder trial. The
judge instructed the jury about the decision, and after three days of deliberation, the jury
announced that it could not reach unanimity on the death penalty. Mohamed was sentenced
to life imprisonment without possibility of parole (Amnesty International 2001).
The most important decision in this area, however, arises from the ECHR in a case
involving surrender by British troops in Iraq of Iraqi prisoners in their custody to officials
of that country, where the men faced criminal charges that might result in capital
punishment. In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, a Chamber of the European
Court dealt with the issue of the death penalty and the possible return, or refoulement,
of these individuals to situations in which they might face inhuman treatment pending
or during their possible executions. Two aspects of the decision deserve attention. First,
the court held that consistent state practice within the Council of Europe, together with
the ratification by all but two member states of Protocol 13, abolishing the death penalty
for all purposes, had “amended [Article 2 of the Convention] so as to prohibit the death
penalty in all circumstances.” The language of that article’s provision dealing with possible
imposition of the death penalty does not continue “to act as a bar to [the court’s] interpreting
the words ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ in Article 3 as including the
death penalty” (Al-Saadoon 2010:¶ 120). Thus, the court seems to both eliminate any
further exception to the right to life for the death penalty under Article 2 of the European
Convention, while recognizing that the death penalty amounts to cruel and inhuman
treatment. The decision by the Court not to send the matter to the Grand Chamber seems
to confirm this result (Thienel 2010).
The second important point relates to the Article 3 claim itself. The court returns to
language similar to that in Soering and the death row phenomenon. From the time of ac-
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ceptance by the Iraqi courts of jurisdiction over their cases in 2006, “the applicants were
subjected to a well-founded fear of execution. It is reasonable to assume that this fear
must have caused the applicants intense psychological suffering” that “intensified . . . and
continues to this day” when they were actually transferred (at ¶ 136). In short, surrender
of the individuals in question by the United Kingdom failed to take proper account of
their obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol 13,
because “there were substantial grounds for believing that the applicants would face a real
risk of being sentenced to death and executed” (at ¶ 143). This decision, together with
that of the Human Rights Committee in Judge, seems to close off any possibility that an
abolitionist state might surrender a prisoner to a retentionist state without assurances
against the death penalty. Indeed, one scholar finds that the prohibition on removal
without assurances against the death penalty has ripened into a norm of customary international law (Kelly 2004:62).

Denial of Consular Access to Foreign Nationals
on Death Row in the United States
On May 1, 2002, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest court of that
state in criminal appeals, vacated the death sentence of Gerardo Valdez, a Mexican citizen
who had been convicted of a murder that occurred in 1989. Among the claims raised in
his appeal was an argument that the state of Oklahoma did not comply with the terms
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention). Article 36 of that
treaty, ratified by the United States, requires that local authorities immediately notify a
detained foreign national of his right to communicate with the consulate of his home
country. If the detainee requests access to his consulate, Article 36 also requires that the
local authorities must promptly notify consular officials of the detention. Finally, authorities
must allow consular representatives the right to visit, converse and correspond with their
nationals, and to provide then with legal representation (Babcock 2005:68). State officials
conceded that Mr. Valdez had not been notified of his consular rights at the time of his
detention, and the Mexican government did not become aware of his arrest, conviction
and sentence until April of 2001. Oklahoma prosecutors agreed with the defense that the
government had not complied with the Vienna Convention, but they argued that noncompliance with the treaty should have no effect on Valdez’s conviction or sentence.
Mexican officials took a strong role in assisting Mr. Valdez as soon as they learned of
his detention in Oklahoma. In addition to filing a friend-of-court brief on his behalf in
the Court of Criminal Appeals, consular officials assisted in the representation of Mr.
Valdez at his clemency hearing before the Oklahoma Board of Pardons and Paroles.
Through expert testimony, they established that Mr. Valdez suffered from severe organic
brain damage as a result of head injuries sustained in his youth. His brain damage was
exacerbated by alcohol abuse in the family, and these factors contributed to and altered
his behavior. Mr. Valdez’s appointed lawyer, for whom this was his first capital murder
case, had not investigated or found the evidence in question.
The Parole Board heard the new evidence and recommended to the governor that the
death sentence be commuted to life without parole. Governor Frank Keating, however,
ultimately denied clemency and the case went back to the courts. When presented with
his subsequent appeal arguing the Vienna Convention issues, the Oklahoma Court of
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Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that it “cannot have confidence in the
jury’s sentencing determination and affirm its assessment of a death sentence where the
jury was not presented with very significant and important evidence bearing on [Valdez’s]
mental status and psyche at the time of the crime” (Valdez 2002:710). The efforts of the
Mexican government on behalf of their national had paid off by saving his life.
Gerardo Valdez is one of more than 140 identified foreign nationals from 37 countries
on death row in the United States as of February 2013, and like some 60 of those individuals,
he is a Mexican national (Death Penalty Information Center 2013b). Valdez’s case is one of
many that have evolved from the complex interplay of three cases brought in the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), discussed above. Those cases involved, respectively, Paraguay, Germany
and Mexico, each of whose governments brought actions in the ICJ on behalf of their
nationals: Breard, LaGrand and Avena (and 50 others), respectively (Case 1998; Case 2004;
LaGrand 2001; see generally Clarke et al. 2004:283–302). In each case, the foreign governments
prevailed. Mexico, by far the most aggressive of the three countries to defend its nationals
on U.S. death rows, had begun international litigation even before the Avena case, with a
request for an advisory opinion from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Advisory
Opinion 2000). The court, in the first international judicial decision on this issue, found
that the Vienna Convention confers specific legal and human rights on foreign detainees.
The U.S. State Department responded to the decision by asserting that the court was “not
charged with resolving disputes under or interpreting the VCCR, and its decision is in no
way binding on the United States” (quoted in Warren 2004–2005:324). The cases in the ICJ
were unquestionably the appropriate forum for resolving disputes under the VCCR, yet the
U.S. continued to balk at compliance with its treaty obligations.
The ICJ’s Avena decision is discussed at the outset of this chapter, in conjunction with
the disappointing decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas, on treaty interpretation, and U.S. acceptance of the decisions of international tribunals. Another
U.S. case involving application of the VCCR after Avena was also resolved against another
Texas death-row inmate from Mexico, Humberto Leal Garcia, who was subsequently
executed (Stewart 2011). The ICJ decision in Avena also led to the United States’ unfortunate
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the VCCR, which makes the ICJ the arbiter of
disputes as to its application (Quigley 2009). This section, however, will point to positive
effects flowing from the Avena litigation, cases with outcomes like that achieved for
Gerardo Valdez. In addition, it will point to efforts by the Obama administration to
comply with its obligations under the Avena decision.
One of the most significant accomplishments of the Avena litigation in the ICJ was
that the United States complied with the ICJ’s provisional measures order in the case,
which asked the U.S. not to act to change the status quo during the pending international
litigation. State officials in the U.S. did honor the measures, “leading to a five-year
moratorium on the execution of Mexican nationals in the United States” (Babcock
2012:185). In the three most urgent cases, defense lawyers contacted prosecutors in Texas
and Oklahoma, and in each, the prosecutors agreed to defer the setting of execution dates
while Avena was pending. Sandra Babcock, a U.S. law professor, former death-penalty
litigator, and counsel for the Mexican government in Avena, characterizes these steps as
“nothing short of extraordinary” for those involved in capital litigation (Babcock 2012:189).
Since the decision in Avena, there have been a growing number of favorable decisions.
In the Oklahoma case of Osbaldo Torres, his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 2005, with the Oklahoma governor taking note that the U.S. State
Department had intervened twice, recommending clemency. On the same day, the
Oklahoma criminal appeals court remanded Torres’ case for an evidentiary hearing to
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decide whether he had been prejudiced by the Vienna Convention violation. The county
district court, having heard evidence from a team of Mexican lawyers and other experts,
determined that prejudice had occurred (Crook 2005:695– 696). Professor Babcock notes
a similar outcome in an Arkansas death penalty case involving Rafael Camargo, another
Mexican national whose sentence was commuted to life imprisonment (Babcock 2012:192).
Still another favorable decision came from the Nevada courts in the case of Carlos Gutierrez,
one of the 51 Mexican nationals from the Avena litigation, on death row there. An appellate
court ordered remand and reconsideration of the sentence imposed, as well as whether
prejudice resulted from the failure of officials to advise Gutierrez of his Vienna Convention
rights (Crook 2013:216–218). In Massachusetts, the state supreme court acknowledged
its responsibility, after Avena, to provide meaningful review when an Article 36 violation
of the treaty is established (Commonwealth 2011:625). Mark Warren, working with the
Death Penalty Information Center in Washington, DC, has compiled an extensive chart
of death-sentenced foreign nationals granted executive clemency, released due to innocence,
or the subjects of other “noteworthy” developments (Warren 2012).
Section 10.6 of the American Bar Association (ABA) Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases acknowledges the importance
of command of international law in capital representation, and particularly the necessity
that capital counsel advise a foreign national client of rights under the VCCR (Wilson
2003:1195). This obligation, however, extends not only to advise foreign nationals but
also to a more general knowledge of international law, as set out in standards, which call
for all capital defense counsel to have a working knowledge of international law, as set
out in Guidelines 5.1.B.2.a, and 8.1.B.1, on training (American Bar Association 2003).
No organization better personifies the commitment to mastery of international law as it
applies under the Vienna Convention than MCLAP, the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance
Program. Begun in 2000, the program focuses its resources on all Mexican nationals on
death rows in the U.S. or who face the risk of the death penalty in pretrial proceedings.
As of 2008, MCLAP had twenty-one veteran attorneys available to advise on issues involving
the VCCR and to provide other resources to Mexican national defendants facing capital
charges or death sentences. Again, as of 2008, in the 298 cases in which a final disposition
had occurred, the project had a ninety-five percent success rate in avoiding or reversing
death sentences (Kuykendall et al. 2008:1000).
In an October, 2012 lecture, the U.S. State Department’s Legal Advisor, Harold Koh,
noted efforts by the U.S. government to implement the Avena decision on three fronts:
support of state and federal litigation to implement international legal obligations under
Avena; support for legislation, the Consular Notification Compliance Act, to implement
the Avena decision; and promotion of awareness of obligations under the VCCR, including
publication of a manual for law enforcement officials (Crook 2013:210–211). These efforts
may serve to mitigate some of the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention.

The Next Frontier: Universal Abolition or
Advance by Increments?
Within the decade since the publication of the second edition of this book, there have
been extraordinary worldwide advances in the abolition of the death penalty. In the last
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edition, this chapter correctly predicted that the death penalty for juveniles would be
abolished in the United States, in part based on data on its abolition around the world.
That abolition trend is moving inexorably toward worldwide elimination of the death
penalty. However, the continued use of the death penalty by the United States, “a country
that proudly champions democratic values, human rights, and political freedom, has
become one of the greatest obstacles to the acceptance by other retentionist countries that
capital punishment inherently and inevitably violates human rights” (Hood and Hoyle
2009:49). What is to be done?
The U.S. death penalty is not likely to disappear through legislative action in the 32
retentionist states, although the pace of abolition by the states has also picked up in the
past decade. It is more likely that successful attacks will occur around the edges of the
death penalty, limiting it further with movements like the one that challenges the
manufacture of certain drugs for use in lethal injections. Another likely candidate for
limitation of the penalty might arise in the area of the execution of the mentally ill.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the practice of the international community
when it struck down the death penalty for the mentally retarded in Atkins v. Virginia in
2002, retardation and mental illness are not the same. In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court
also struck down the death penalty for those who are legally insane in Ford v. Wainwright,
one of the cases in which the Court took note of the practice of civilized society in its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment (Ford 1986). Again, however, the legal definitions
of insanity vary, and none is as comprehensive as the term “mental illness.”
The National Alliance on Mental Illness defines the term as “medical conditions that
disrupt a person’s thinking, feeling, mood, ability to relate to others and daily functioning.
Serious mental illnesses include major depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive
compulsive disorder (OCD), panic disorder, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
borderline personality disorder” (Death Penalty Information Center 2013a). A definition
this broad, however, creates problems of definitional boundaries for the courts. Another
issue in this area is the question of whether medication, either voluntary or forced, can
be used to obtain a stable state of competency in order to carry out an execution. One
scholar suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court will have to confront the issue of medicated
competency in order to prevent the possibility of further violations of the Eighth
Amendment (Entzeroth 2009:660).
International standards make the execution of a severely mentally ill person a violation
of human rights. The European Union includes the protection of those suffering from
insanity or “any mental illness or any intellectual disability” among its priority areas of
concern for limitation of the death penalty (European Union 2008:6; Council of European
Union 2013:11). The issue of mental illness seems a likely candidate for further limitation
of the death penalty on the road to total abolition.
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